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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2986 
_____________ 
 
HOMNATH SUBEDI, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A209-429-561) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 26, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 2, 2018) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Homnath Subedi petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his request for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  We will deny the petition. 
I. Background1 
 Subedi is a native and citizen of Nepal who entered the United States illegally.  He 
fled Nepal because of his fear that a political group known as the Maoists might harm 
him.  Around 2001 or 2002, when he was twelve years old and living in his hometown of 
Myagdi, Maoists killed his mother.  She had been a member of a rival political group 
called the Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”).  He remembers that Maoists asked his mother 
for help and, after she refused, they beat her so badly that she died the next day.  For 
more than a decade after that incident, however, he did not experience any problems with 
Maoists.   
 Years later, in 2013 and still in Myagdi, Subedi attended a meeting of the NCP.  
At some point during his four- to five-hour journey home through the jungle afterwards, 
several Maoists stopped him and beat him with bamboo sticks.  The attack left him with 
bruises and a broken tooth.  He apparently fainted during the encounter, and, when he 
awoke, he slowly continued to walk home and recovered there rather than going to the 
hospital to seek medical treatment.   
                                              
1  The facts in this case are drawn from the administrative record developed before 
the agency. 
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 Subedi next encountered Maoists when “Constituent Assembly elections” were 
held in November 2013.  (J.A. at 222.)  According to his account, on his way to the 
school where the polling station was located, Maoists detained him, locked him in a 
school bathroom, and prevented him from voting.  Subedi testified that he was locked up 
alongside one of his friends for six hours, that his hands and legs were tied, and that the 
Maoists said “we know what happened to your mother[.]”  (J.A. at 63.)  After the 
incident, they instructed Subedi to join their political party within one month’s time.   
 Following that second incident, Subedi moved to Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal.  
He lived in a hotel where he found work for four to five months.  He got married and 
continued working at the hotel for several more months, but he returned home to Myagdi 
for a short time to take school exams.  During the brief period he was home, Subedi 
received a threatening phone call from Maoists demanding that he join their political 
party.  He returned to Kathmandu where he remained for almost a year before going 
home to Myagdi in February 2016.  He only went back home that last time to get a 
reissued national identification card after his citizenship documents were lost in an 
earthquake.  Subedi claims that, while back in Myagdi, he was “slightly threatened” by 
an unknown individual who encouraged him to stay in his home village and join the 
Maoist party.  (J.A. at 171.) 
 Subedi testified that he then came to the United States because of his fear that 
there was nowhere safe to live in Nepal, that Maoists may attempt to kill him, and that 
the government in Nepal could not protect him.  He believes that he cannot live safely in 
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Kathmandu because the Maoists have “a network and they are looking for [him.]”  (J.A. 
at 68-69.) 
 Removal proceedings were initiated against Subedi, and he concedes that he is 
removable under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  He applied for asylum and statutory withholding of 
removal based on persecution on account of his political opinion.  He also applied for 
relief under the CAT.   
 The immigration judge (“IJ”) assigned to the case issued an oral decision denying 
Subedi all relief.  The IJ refused to “make an adverse credibility finding per se,” but said 
“that does not mean [he] necessarily accept[ed] [Subedi’s] recounting of the facts as he 
testified[.]”  (J.A. at 136.)  Instead, the IJ said there was no evidence amounting to past 
persecution.  He said that the beating by Maoists after a political meeting “was a random 
act of violence[,]” and Subedi suffered “no real harm because … he went home and was 
just treated at home.”  (J.A. at 136.)  The IJ suggested that the account of Subedi being 
locked away in a bathroom for several hours was incredible and was otherwise not 
something that rose to the level of past persecution.   
 The IJ also determined that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  Although the evidence demonstrated that Maoists 
were causing some violence and political problems in 2013, there was proof of changed 
country conditions.  He noted that the Nepali government is now led by a Maoist leader 
with the support of the NCP through “some type of conciliation” or “agreement” between 
the rival political parties.  (J.A. at 136-37.)  Moreover, he explained, there was no 
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evidence that Subedi would be harmed in Kathmandu, given that he had previously lived 
there for an extended period of time without incident.  Thus, even if there were evidence 
sufficient to establish past persecution, the IJ concluded that the government had met its 
burden of overcoming the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.   
 Finally, the IJ concluded that there was no evidence in the record suggesting 
Subedi would likely be tortured by Maoists if removed to Nepal because there is a 
conciliation between the rival political parties and there was no evidence that Subedi 
could not safely relocate to his hometown or to Kathmandu.  The IJ ultimately ordered 
Subedi removed from the United States in accordance with § 241(b)(1)(A) of the INA.   
 Subedi appealed to the BIA, which agreed with the IJ and dismissed the appeal.  
The BIA began by noting that the IJ “did not make an explicit credibility finding,” and 
thus it assumed Subedi’s testimony to be credible.  (J.A. at 7 n.1.)  Like the IJ, the BIA 
determined that Subedi had not established past persecution because his two major 
interactions with Maoists – the bamboo stick beating and the school restroom detention – 
did “not in the aggregate rise to the level of persecution.”  (J.A. at 7.)  It also noted that 
the grevious harm suffered by Subedi’s mother was not enough, by itself, to establish past 
persecution of Subedi.  Because past persecution had not been shown, the BIA concluded 
that Subedi was not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution and 
that, independent of the presumption, he failed to establish eligibility for asylum or 
statutory withholding of removal.  The BIA said that Subedi had not proven an 
objectively reasonable fear of persecution in Nepal because he lived in Kathmandu 
without experiencing harm or threats of harm, and there was evidence that the Maoists 
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and NCP had been working together in government.  Finally, the BIA agreed with the IJ 
that Subedi had not established that it is more likely than not that he would be subjected 
to torture if returned to Nepal.   
 Subedi timely filed the present petition for review.   
II. Discussion2 
Subedi argues that we must vacate the BIA’s decision to deny his asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT claims.  The record, however, dictates that we deny his 
petition for review. 
According to Subedi, he is entitled to asylum because substantial evidence 
demonstrates that he suffered past persecution and that he has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.  He contends that “the BIA failed to assess the cumulative effect of 
[his] experience” based on the record as a whole.  (Opening Br. at 12.)  Applying the 
mandated deferential standard of review, we conclude that the IJ’s and BIA’s contrary 
finding is supported by substantial evidence.  It is true that, “in determining whether 
actual or threatened mistreatment amounts to persecution, ‘[t]he cumulative effect of the 
                                              
2  The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “We review the BIA’s legal 
determinations de novo, subject to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 
623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review factual findings under the substantial-
evidence standard.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under that 
standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  “Because the BIA did not summarily affirm the IJ’s order but instead 
issued a separate opinion, we review the BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling 
only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.”  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
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applicant’s experience must be taken into account’ because ‘[t]aking isolated incidents 
out of context may be misleading.’”  Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 192 (3d Cir. 
2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Manzur v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 
290 (2d Cir. 2007)).  But here, the BIA expressly noted that its decision that Subedi failed 
to establish past persecution was based on the evidence “in the aggregate[.]”  (J.A. at 7.) 
Moreover, taking the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence to support the 
BIA’s conclusion.  We have said that “[p]ersecution ‘is an extreme concept that does not 
include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.’”  Jarbough v. Att’y 
Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  Persecution includes “threats 
to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a 
threat to life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  But 
“[a]busive treatment and harassment, while always deplorable, may not rise to the level 
of persecution.”  Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 191.  The isolated incidents that occurred here, 
including the bamboo stick incident and school restroom detention, did not rise to the 
necessary level of severe threat to life or freedom.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 
615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]solated incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise to 
the level of persecution.”).  And while we agree with Subedi that he is not relying solely 
on the death of his mother at the hands of Maoists to establish past persecution, even 
considering that terrible event in the mix of evidence as the BIA did, the same result 
remains.  See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (noting that reversal of the 
agency’s denial of asylum is only warranted when the evidence is so compelling that no 
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite likelihood of persecution).  Her 
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death, though tragic, occurred over a decade before Subedi’s other alleged encounters 
with the Maoists, and, in the interim, Subedi admitted that he experienced no problems 
with them.  Thus, the record, when taken in its entirety, does not compel the conclusion 
that Subedi suffered past persecution.  See id. at 481 n.1 (“To reverse [a] BIA finding[,] 
we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it[.]”). 
Regardless, substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Subedi 
failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.  A significant factor in 
determining whether an alien has a well-founded fear of persecution is whether he can 
relocate within his country of origin.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i).  As the BIA discussed, 
the record suggests that Subedi could, at the very least, safely reside in Kathmandu as he 
did for a significant period of time prior to entering the United States.  Thus, we cannot 
say that a reasonable factfinder would be required to conclude that Subedi has a well-
founded fear of persecution based on the evidence in the record.3 
 Turning to Subedi’s withholding of removal claim, because he cannot meet the 
well-founded fear of persecution standard for asylum, it necessarily follows that he 
cannot meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal.  See Chen v. 
Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004) (“An alien who fails to establish that he or she 
has a well-founded fear of persecution, so as to be eligible for asylum, necessarily will 
fail to establish the right to withholding of removal.”). 
                                              
3  Because we conclude that the BIA did not err when it determined that Subedi 
failed to prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, we do not 
need to consider Subedi’s argument that the BIA erred when it agreed with the IJ’s 
conclusion that Subedi did not meet his burden to prove a nexus between the alleged 
persecution and a protected ground. 
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Subedi also challenges the denial of his claim for CAT relief.  But he has failed to 
establish, for the reasons stated above, that he would likely be harmed if he returned to 
Nepal.  Furthermore, as the BIA noted, nothing in the record demonstrates that he will be 
tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Nepali government if he returns to 
Nepal.  Thus, he has not established entitlement to relief under the CAT.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2). 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Subedi’s petition for review. 
